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In labor economics, the efficiency wage hypothesis argues that wages, at least in some markets, form in a way that is not market-clearing. Specifically, it points to the incentive for managers to pay their employees more than the market-clearing wage in order to increase their productivity or efficiency, or reduce costs associated with turnover, in industries where the costs of replacing labor are high. This increased labor productivity and/or decreased costs pay for the higher wages. Because workers are paid more than the equilibrium wage, there may be unemployment. Efficiency wages offer therefore a market failure explanation of unemployment – in contrast to theories which emphasize government intervention (such as minimum wages).〔Mankiw, Gregory N. & Taylor, Mark P. (2008), ''Macroeconomics'' (European edition), pp. 181–182〕 However, efficiency wages do not necessarily imply unemployment, but only uncleared markets and job rationing in those markets. There may be full employment in the economy, and yet efficiency wages may prevail in some occupations. In this case there will be excess supply for those occupations, but some applicants are not hired and have to work for a probably lower wage elsewhere. The term "efficiency-wages" (or rather "efficiency-earnings") has been introduced by Alfred Marshall to denote the wage per efficiency unit of labor.〔Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, London (Macmillan}, 8th ed., Ch, VI.III.10 ()〕 Marshallian efficiency wages would make employers pay different wages to workers who are of different efficiency, such that the employer would be indifferent between more efficient workers and less efficient workers. The modern use of the term is quite different and refers to the idea that higher wages may increase the efficiency of the workers through various channels, and make it worth while for the employers to offer wages that exceed a market-clearing level. ==Overview== There are several theories (or "microfoundations") of why managers pay efficiency wages (wages above the market clearing rate): * ''Avoiding shirking'': If it is difficult to measure the quantity or quality of a worker's effort—and systems of piece rates or commissions are impossible—there may be an incentive for him or her to "shirk" (do less work than agreed). The manager thus may pay an efficiency wage in order to create or increase the cost of job loss, which gives a sting to the threat of firing. This threat can be used to prevent shirking (or "moral hazard"). * ''Minimizing turnover'': By paying above-market wages, the worker's motivation to leave the job and look for a job elsewhere will be reduced. This strategy makes sense because it is often expensive to train replacement workers. * ''Selection'': If job performance depends on workers' ability and workers differ from each other in those terms, firms with higher wages will attract more able job-seekers, and this may make it profitable to offer wages that exceed the market clearing level. * ''Sociological theories'': Efficiency wages may result from traditions. Akerlof's theory (in very simple terms) involves higher wages encouraging high morale, which raises productivity. * ''Nutritional theories'': In developing countries, efficiency wages may allow workers to eat well enough to avoid illness and to be able to work harder and even more productively. The model of efficiency wages, largely based on shirking, developed by Carl Shapiro and Joseph E. Stiglitz has been particularly influential. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Efficiency wage」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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